A few weeks ago, Ynet published an article about Israelis who have left the country. One of those interviewed, Anna Sichaks, moved to Portugal with her family after October 7. She does not describe the move as “relocation,” nor does she leave it shrouded in the ambiguity of something temporary. “We didn’t relocate—we chose to emigrate,” she says. She describes a calmer life, greater personal security, more time for family, and a different quality of life. She hopes her daughter will grow into the local identity and will not see Portugal merely as a temporary stop.
Something feels new both in an article like this and in the tone in which it is written. In the past, such people were called yordim—literally, those who “descended” from Israel. The word itself carried a moral judgment: to move to Israel was aliyah, ascent; to leave it was yeridah, descent. Yitzhak Rabin gave sharp expression to this attitude in the 1970s when he called emigrants “the dregs of the weak.”
Today, the language has changed. Yordim are increasingly described as “Israelis abroad,” as “those leaving,” or—most commonly today—as “emigrants.” The Israel Democracy Institute has even suggested that Israel must “recalculate its approach to the yordim,” treating Israelis abroad as a kind of Israeli diaspora whose connection to the country should be cultivated.
This linguistic shift is happening just as the phenomenon itself becomes a genuine concern. According to a recent Tel Aviv University study, between 2023 and 2025 some 268,000 Israeli citizens left the country for at least three consecutive months, compared with roughly 183,000 during the corresponding period a decade earlier. The researchers stress that this measures extended departure rather than necessarily permanent emigration. Yet the trend is clear, and particularly troubling increases have been recorded among doctors, engineers, academics, and high-income earners.
The Israeli public understands the seriousness of the issue. According to a Reichman University survey, most Israelis believe emigration harms the economy, research, and development, while roughly half believe it also weakens national security and social cohesion. Yet the title the researchers gave their findings is particularly revealing: “Concerned, but Not Angry.” Fifty-five percent expressed understanding for those leaving; only 21 percent expressed anger.
That figure becomes especially interesting when placed alongside another Israeli phenomenon.
A Demand for Partnership
Public anger toward Haredi society has reached very high levels in recent months and years, above all because of military service. After two years of war, tens of thousands of reserve-duty days, deaths and injuries, and a genuine manpower shortage in the IDF, this is hardly surprising. Polls show overwhelming opposition among Jewish Israelis to arrangements that allow continued broad exemption from service, and the general public is furious with the conduct of Haredi political leadership on the issue.
I have written many times that the principal demand directed at us, the Haredim, is not really a demand for equality in its fullest sense. There is no perfect equality of burden in Israel, nor will there ever be. A combat soldier and someone serving at military headquarters do not bear the same burden; a reservist who has served hundreds of days and a family never called to reserve duty do not bear the same burden; men and women, hesder students and ordinary soldiers, Tel Aviv and Modi’in—there is no equality between them. Nor are people’s economic, civic, and social contributions equal.
The deeper demand is not equality but partnership. The Israeli who serves wants to know that we are part of the story: that we see this country as our concern, that we understand that its security is our security, its economy is our economy, and that the costs of maintaining it are not exclusively somebody else’s responsibility. Not every Haredi young man must necessarily become a combat soldier. There is room—indeed, a need—for serious debate about the status of dedicated Torah scholars, the age of service, suitable frameworks, and civilian service. But beneath all these specific questions lies something more basic: Are you with us? That is a legitimate question. In my view, it is even indispensable.
Emigration and refusal to serve are not the same act, and they do not carry the same moral or civic implications. The Israeli who leaves may well have served in the army, paid taxes for many years, and fulfilled every conventional civic obligation before choosing to build his future elsewhere. The point is not to equate the two decisions. The point concerns something that precedes moral judgment: our willingness to understand.
Yet here an intriguing contradiction emerges. The same Israeli society that finds it exceedingly difficult to understand the Haredi man from Bnei Brak or Jerusalem who does not enlist shows considerable understanding toward the Israeli who leaves the country altogether. The comparison, however, requires care. Emigration and refusal to serve are not the same act, and they do not carry the same moral or civic implications. The Israeli who leaves may well have served in the army, paid taxes for many years, and fulfilled every conventional civic obligation before choosing to build his future elsewhere. The point is not to equate the two decisions. The point concerns something that precedes moral judgment: our willingness to understand.
When an Israeli leaves for Portugal, Prague, or New York, we instinctively try to enter his world. We ask what drove him there. We take his concern for his children seriously, his economic calculations, his sense of insecurity, his frustration with the political system. We may think he is making a mistake; we may even believe that his departure harms the country. Yet we are willing to acknowledge that his decision emerges from recognizable human concerns.
Why, then, is that willingness so often absent when the person before us is Haredi?
Whose Values Do We Understand?
Surveys of Israeli society help explain at least part of the answer. According to the Israel Democracy Institute, among Jewish Israelis, willingness to consider leaving is especially high among secular Israelis, younger people, and higher earners. Thirty-nine percent of secular respondents said they had considered moving abroad, compared with only 3 percent of Haredim. More than 40 percent of those on the political left and 35 percent of those in the center had considered leaving, compared with 19 percent on the right. The cost of living, concern for children’s futures, and the security situation are major push factors; among those on the left and center, the political situation and quality of government also play a significant role.
Even for those who have no intention of leaving, these motives are easy for a modern Western Israeli to understand. Who does not want security for his children? Who does not want affordable housing, a better salary, efficient public services, and a calmer life? Someone who sees danger in the political direction of the country can understand a person who says, “I am not prepared to raise my children here.” One may regret the decision, but the motive is intelligible. Even if most Israelis regard emigration as a danger to the country’s future, they still see the reasons behind it as legitimate—particularly the security situation and a lack of trust in the political system.
In other words, we find it relatively easy to understand people whose decisions are rooted in values we ourselves share. The person who moves to Portugal because he wants more quiet, security, income, family time, or a political and cultural environment better suited to him is making a decision we can imagine making. Even if we remain here, we understand the calculation.
The grandfather came to Israel at enormous personal cost, driven by a burning desire to settle the land and build a Jewish state. His son was born into that state and took its existence for granted. His grandson may ask a different question: if I have a European passport, a portable profession, and the possibility of raising my children somewhere cheaper, safer, and calmer—why not? Even if we dislike the question, we understand it.
But the Haredi we often do not understand. Toward him, the reaction is one of bewilderment: What is so complicated? Why don’t you enlist? Why don’t you study English and mathematics? Why don’t you participate in the economy? Why don’t you become part of the state? Beneath these questions lies another one: Why don’t you simply become more like us?
It is harder to understand someone for whom religious continuity, insulation from secular culture, fidelity to a communal way of life, and the spiritual formation of his children carry a weight that outsiders may find disproportionate or even incomprehensible.
And here Israeli public discourse fails. The moral challenge of understanding another person begins precisely where his values stop mirroring our own. It is easy to recognize the desire for economic security because we desire it too. It is easy to recognize the desire for political freedom, personal autonomy, or quality of life because these are central goods in the culture we inhabit. It is harder to understand someone for whom religious continuity, insulation from secular culture, fidelity to a communal way of life, and the spiritual formation of his children carry a weight that outsiders may find disproportionate or even incomprehensible.
Yet these are no less real because we do not share them.
This does not mean that the demands directed at Haredi society are wrong. On the contrary, I have made those very demands repeatedly, both in the pages of Tzarich Iyun and elsewhere. I believe Haredi society must assume far greater responsibility for the State of Israel; that someone who is not genuinely and fully engaged in Torah study should serve; that we must gradually move from dependency toward economic independence; and that we must increasingly see ourselves not as a community living alongside the state but as part of the Israeli “we.”
But such a transformation is more complicated than it appears. Haredi society was built, to a significant degree, around the idea of protection from what lies outside. It sought to create a space that could preserve faith, Halacha, Torah, and Jewish identity within a threatening modern world. Separation is not an accidental malfunction in the system; it is deeply embedded in its architecture.
Military service is therefore not merely a question of devoting three years of one’s life. Even if the food meets the highest kashrut standards, the unit is gender-segregated, and times for prayer and Torah study are carefully protected, the very act of entering the IDF marks a dramatic shift whose significance should not be minimized. The Haredi young man puts on the uniform of the state, serves beneath its flag, joins an institution that is perhaps the clearest embodiment of the Zionist enterprise, and becomes a direct partner in responsibility for the State of Israel.
That is a change in identity and a change in the consciousness of responsibility. In a certain sense, it is even a change in purpose itself: from a society primarily concerned with protecting itself from the state and the surrounding culture to one that accepts responsibility for the state itself. I believe we are already in the midst of this transition, and that we ought to undertake it consciously, carefully, and intelligently. More than that, I believe it is essential to the future of Haredi society itself. But I also understand perfectly well why it is frightening.
One can understand a fear even while believing that it leads to the wrong conclusion.
Understanding Is Not Agreement
This is the point I find so badly missing from public discourse. If we are capable of understanding someone who takes the academic training he acquired with the help of Israeli society, his profession, and his earning power and moves with them to Prague or Lisbon; if we can understand a family whose children will not serve in the IDF—I am aware that the adults concerned will generally have served themselves, a relevant but hardly decisive distinction—and whose taxes will henceforth be paid to another country; if we can even ask how Israel should maintain a relationship with the emigrant and keep the door open for his return, then surely we can also attempt to understand a Haredi who fears that entering state institutions may destabilize his own spiritual world and that of his children.
Again, the argument is not that the two cases are equivalent. They are not. It is that understanding should not be reserved for those whose hierarchy of values resembles our own. If empathy extends only to choices we can imagine making ourselves, it is not much of an achievement. The real test comes when we encounter a person whose deepest concerns are not ours, whose fears seem exaggerated to us, and whose choices we may believe to be profoundly mistaken.
Understanding is not agreement. Nor does understanding mean abandoning the demand for change. Quite the opposite: only when I understand another person can I ask him to change in a way that has some prospect of succeeding in reality. A society that wants Haredim to change has an interest not merely in defeating their arguments, but in understanding what they fear losing.
The same is true of those leaving the country. The proper response is not to return to Rabin’s rhetoric of “the dregs of the weak.” If the cost of living, insecurity, poor governance, or concern for their children’s future are pushing Israelis abroad, then the state must ask how those problems can be addressed. Insult alone will not bring someone back from Portugal.
The same applies to Haredim. Hatred will not bring Haredim into the army, and humiliation will not create partnership. If genuine change is desired, we must build credible frameworks. The Haredi way of life must be protected seriously. It must be possible to serve without a hidden expectation that the soldier emerge as a different kind of person. The process must be one Haredi society can enter with confidence, not with the feeling that it is being asked to dismantle its own identity.
At the same time, we Haredim must stop using fear as an excuse for inaction. Understanding the fear does not sanctify the conclusion it leads to. We cannot ask Israeli society to understand us without also understanding the soldier who has served 300 days of reserve duty and the wife left at home, the mother sending a son back into Gaza, and the public that rightly asks how long responsibility can continue falling on the same people again and again. Their fears, too, are real. Their children’s futures, too, are at stake.
Partnership requires two sides.
On the Eve of Yom Kippur
Yom Kippur invites each of us to examine his own sins before dwelling on those of his neighbor. We Haredim have much for which to repent: for years in which we focused too much on what the State of Israel owed us and too little on what we owe it; for failing, in time, to develop appropriate solutions for those whose Torah study is not truly their full-time vocation; and for becoming accustomed, at times, to speaking about security, the economy, and society as though they belonged to “them,” when we live here, our children live here, and our fate is entirely intertwined with the fate of the state. After October 7, these truths have become far harder to ignore.
But broader Israeli society, too, has matters for repentance: for the ease with which even justified criticism turns into hostility; for the ease with which a demand for responsibility turns into ridicule of an entire way of life; and for the ease with which the Haredi stops being a brother who must be persuaded and becomes an enemy who must be defeated.
There is something unfair, even hypocritical, in a public discourse that grants expansive understanding to the Israeli who leaves the country but refuses even to enter the inner world of the Haredi who remains here. Again, the point is not that leaving Israel and refusing to serve impose the same obligations or carry the same consequences.
There is something unfair, even hypocritical, in a public discourse that grants expansive understanding to the Israeli who leaves the country but refuses even to enter the inner world of the Haredi who remains here. Again, the point is not that leaving Israel and refusing to serve impose the same obligations or carry the same consequences. The point is that the moral test of understanding is not whether we can understand those whose choices resemble our own. It is whether we can understand people whose choices we reject.
We can say to the emigrant: I understand why you seek security, tranquility, and a better future for your children, and still I regret that you are leaving. And we can say to the Haredi: I understand why you fear the army and the encounter with broader Israeli society, and still I demand that you find a way to become a partner. There is no contradiction between these statements. On the contrary, this is what serious moral discourse looks like: taking another person’s world seriously without surrendering one’s own judgment.
Perhaps, if we learn to speak to one another in this way—with less accusation and greater understanding, without relinquishing responsibility and without relinquishing brotherhood—we may also find the compromises we so desperately need. Haredim will carry a greater share of responsibility. Israeli society will learn that there is more than one way to be Israeli. And perhaps, if we can recover something of the sense that this is a shared project, fewer Israelis will feel compelled to seek their future overseas.
Because ultimately, the question facing all of us—Haredim, secular Israelis, religious Israelis, those who serve, and even those considering leaving—is not only what the State of Israel gives us. It is what we are prepared to give so that it may continue to exist.
While the article makes an interesting point – it (intentionally?) dodges a major consideration of the conversation. Most secular people I come in contact with feel hostility toward the Haredim not only because of the lack of shared partnership – but because of their systemic lying and stealing, with the full support of the roshei yeshiva.
An estimated 60% of the Haredim are not studying full-time, lying to the government claiming they are studying, and receiving yeshiva stipends. This has been well documented. When Torah systemically becomes “mitzvah ha’ba b’aveira” – the serving community becomes infuriated.
It would be appropriate for Tzarich Iyun to address this issue.
Those, of an age in the Religious Zionist camp, recall the writings of a young Rabbi Meir Kahane in 1984, “But What About Israel?” He understood Hebrew-Speaking Portuguese right here in Israel. Those of us who made Aliya from comfortable English speaking homes in countries not having a draft in decades to, בדווקה, send our all our children/grandchildren to the Israeli Army, have rather little “balanced understanding,” neither for the Yordim nor the Hareidim.
I am not Israeli so feel free to disregard my comment.
It seems to me that the difference is that the Israeli emigrating from Israel understands and accepts he can no longer count on the support of the country he left behind, but the Chareidi who choose not to partner with Israel still expects that county to support him financially.