A recent discussion in a professional Charedi women’s circle of which I am part began, ostensibly, as a conversation about the conditions required for organizing a group event. Yet it soon revealed something far larger: a powerful social mechanism that consistently rewards movement toward greater stringency, while rendering moderation difficult to voice and costly to defend.
The ground rules were defined before the conversation had even begun: food under the kashrut of the Eda HaCharedit, and complete separation, down to the level of the lecturers themselves.
Negotiations with outside parties in order to secure these conditions were far from simple. Yet they concluded with understanding, and with considerable effort on the part of those very parties—who do not belong to Charedi society—to arrange the special conditions required. And then a single email, cast into the group space, made plain just how elusive and fragile that achievement really was. One of the participants wondered how it could be that no guarantee had been given that all the professional lecturers would themselves be Charedi. She added that she was certain most of the group shared her view, and that without this condition, the event ought simply to be cancelled.
The email, sent to a distribution list of some two hundred women, was met with silence, save for one apologetic response that attempted to explain the bureaucratic difficulty of persuading those responsible of the necessity of this new condition. After several days, I decided to respond. I felt I had to explain that it was hardly self-evident that cancelling the event was the only possible outcome, given the new, wholly unexpected threshold that had been set.
It turned out that at least half the women in the group thought I was right, and some even thanked me for having “spoken for” them. Yet despite this broad agreement behind closed doors, not a single woman dared voice her opposition publicly, and some were afraid to do so even in private conversation.
Following that email, something interesting occurred: my private inbox was flooded with dozens of messages. It turned out that at least half the women in the group thought I was right, and some even thanked me for having “spoken for” them. Yet despite this broad agreement behind closed doors, not a single woman dared voice her opposition publicly, and some were afraid to do so even in private conversation.
This episode is only a small window into a phenomenon I have been observing with no small measure of astonishment. It is a one-directional, deeply consistent mechanism existing within Charedi society (and likely within other value-driven societies as well) that grants unqualified social capital to the movement “to the right”—not in the conventional political sense, but in the direction of the society’s foundational values, toward greater stringency.
By contrast, it activates a well-oiled system of social sanctions against anyone who dares to voice positions of moderation or compromise. In sociological language, this is known as a one-way ratchet of stringency. Within such a system, deviation in the conservative direction is always perceived as “prudent caution” or chassidut, while any attempt to ease or moderate is seen as “spiritual cooling” or reform. Extremity thus becomes a kind of social insurance policy, one for which there is no penalty. The result is a steady erosion of the moderate voice and an unceasing shift toward greater stringency.
Costly Signals
In his book Judaism Straight Up, Professor Moshe Koppel explains that a communal society requires mechanisms that ensure its members are in fact committed to it and are not merely “free riders” on the community’s resources. The more alluring—and threatening—the world outside becomes, the more the community requires “costly signaling”: acts that demand unusual sacrifice and effort in order to demonstrate loyalty. Within this structure, stringency and extremity are perceived as the highest forms of loyalty-signaling, and they confer on those who perform them prestige and coveted social standing.
The unceasing need for ever-new signals gives rise to what may be called a “purity spiral,” a process in which the group enters an internal competition over the title of who is more stringent, more loyal, more committed. It is a spiral with no natural stopping point, for one can always become a little more stringent, and today’s extremists quickly become tomorrow’s casualties of those yet more extreme. Within such a spiral, the dominant strategy of each player is to signal a higher degree of religious commitment than the average member. If the median member of the group opposes X, then whoever wishes to preserve a reputation for being especially “high quality” must oppose not only X, but Y as well.
One could adduce countless examples of how this “purity spiral” manifests itself across different societies and settings. To distinguish, of course, with a thousand thousand distinctions, consider for a moment the chain of organizations that eventually produced the monster known as ISIS. It began in the 1980s with the Maktab al-Khidamat in Afghanistan, a logistical organization whose purpose was to recruit funds and volunteers to assist in the war against the Soviets, while focusing on the relatively moderate goal of liberating Muslim lands. Out of that organization, Osama bin Laden established a body with far more radical ambitions: al-Qaeda. He raised the bar to a global jihad against the West, casting his predecessor as a compromiser. The spiral accelerated further when ISIS split from al-Qaeda on the grounds that the latter had grown too soft, and adopted a far more extreme level of brutality. The process reached its height within ISIS itself, with the emergence of the Hazimiyya, a faction so radical that it dared accuse even ISIS leadership of liberalism.
Anyone to whom this pattern of branching sounds familiar from other movements, each one producing from within itself an even more extreme offshoot, does so entirely at his own responsibility.
On the opposite side of the ideological divide, one finds that very same purity spiral at work within the radical Woke movement. There, “holiness” is not measured in terms of fear of Heaven, but in “social justice awareness” and in the capacity to identify with the victim of the moment. Just as ISIS accused al-Qaeda of weakness, so in Woke culture we witness classical liberal figures turning overnight into enemies of the people when they refuse to align themselves with the latest and most updated edge of orthodoxy. Does anybody even remember that J. K. Rowling, darling of anti-Woke conservatives, defines herself as a left-leaning, Labor-voting Liberal?
In such an environment, the way to signal loyalty is by means of updated terminology. The moment a given concept becomes commonplace, it loses its value as a signal of enlightenment, and the spiral drives the invention of a still more extreme, or more “proper,” term. Each player in the group seeks to signal that he is aware of more postcolonial injustices than his fellow players. Whoever dares to wonder, “Perhaps we have gone too far with the boycott of X?” is immediately suspected of “privilege” or of insufficient awareness.
Whether the issue is the demand for exclusively Charedi lecturers in a professional setting or the demand to boycott a novelist at Harvard University, the sociological mechanism is identical. The purity spiral is blind to ideological content; it is interested only in status and in whatever accumulates social capital. It will always reward the one who sets a higher threshold, and punish the one who seeks moderation, change, or compromise.
Alongside the purity spiral runs a process of “preference falsification,” a term coined by the economist Timur Kuran. As the spiral accelerates, group members who do not personally agree with the new and more extreme norms choose silence in order to avoid social sanctions. That silence creates a “false consensus,” which gives radicals the power to push still further, since they mistakenly believe they enjoy sweeping support.
Thus emerged the obligation to travel only on mehadrin buses, the prohibition of phones capable of receiving SMS messages, and the blanket ban on concerts for men and women, even when fully segregated. New stringencies, time and again, win the day.
A rabbinic figure close to me once observed, not without irony, that this dynamic is typical of rabbinic gatherings: each rabbi at the table looks to his right, fears the possible backlash, and decides it is wiser to remain silent. Thus emerged the obligation to travel only on mehadrin buses, the prohibition of phones capable of receiving SMS messages, and the blanket ban on concerts for men and women, even when fully segregated. New stringencies, time and again, win the day.
The silent majority thus becomes captive to the loud and extreme minority. Extremism triumphs not because it is more persuasive, but because it is the only view one may voice “for free,” without incurring a social cost. Moderation, by contrast, becomes a costly good that very few dare purchase openly.
Pluralistic Ignorance: Who Is the Majority, and Who the Minority?
Beyond the natural fear of deviating from the norm, a more basic error is at work: a misunderstanding of the norms themselves.
The professional term for this phenomenon is “pluralistic ignorance,” a state in which the individual holds a mistaken perception of the broader social mood. He wrongly assumes that his own view belongs to a minority. Dr. Nahumi Yaffe has studied this phenomenon specifically within Charedi society, and her findings reveal a dramatic gap between what Charedim themselves think and want for their own lives, and what they attribute to others. Her research found that roughly 50 percent of the Charedi community holds positions favoring greater integration, education, or change in certain norms. Though they make up half the community, those people are convinced that they are a small and isolated minority, and they regard their own view as outside the mainstream—when in fact that imagined mainstream exists only in their minds.
Yaffe explains that Charedi society operates through meta-perceptions. A meta-perception is my perception of what others think. Thus, for example, in my private judgment, I may think there is nothing wrong at all with bringing in a professional lecturer who is not Charedi, but the meta-perception whispers to me: “All the other women in the room will think I am compromised if I say that aloud.” As a result, people keep their opinions to themselves. The silence causes the individual to assume that everyone around her really does endorse the more stringent position, and that she alone is the problematic or weak one. To avoid being pushed out of the group, she radicalizes her outward behavior to align with what she imagines is the majority view. Thus, a self-reinforcing cycle comes into being.
Wherever ideology becomes entangled with social status, extremism becomes the safest refuge. The mechanism is always the same: extremism is the only currency that does not suffer inflation.
It is important to understand that this mechanism is not unique to Charedi society. It operates in every group whose values stand at the center of its identity, from progressive academic circles in the West to elite military units. Wherever ideology becomes entangled with social status, extremism becomes the safest refuge. The mechanism is always the same: extremism is the only currency that does not suffer inflation. When a society rewards only the step “to the right,” the spiral will not stop until it consumes itself—or until someone dares to stop falsifying preferences and say: enough.
I am not, Heaven forbid, opposing the addition of holiness or the pursuit of hiddur in halachah. I ask only that we place on the table the unnoticed social background at work here, and bring some order to a social phenomenon that exacts a heavy price. In our current reality, many boundaries of modesty or halachic embellishments that someone casually releases into the air become, within a short time, a new standard to which all are expected to conform. A person who adopts a new and radical act—whether in dress, technology, kashrut, or public positions—rarely has reason to fear any social cost. The opposite case, however, is a deeply unfair equation: any attempt to propose a necessary correction in places that have drifted somewhat to the edge brings in its wake no small measure of social sanction. This ensures that the movement is always in one direction alone.
As noted above, the situation has reached a point where even rabbis and public figures, whose commitment to and fear of Heaven are beyond question, may at times be afraid to publicly support measured and thoughtful compromise. They may refrain from doing so even when they are convinced that such steps are critically important for the Yiddishkeit of the generation.
Try to imagine a mother arriving at an educational institution and asking to add a new, stricter rule to the dress code. Her proposal may be accepted, or it may not—but one thing is certain: she will not leave embarrassed. In complete contrast, a mother who arrives and attempts to challenge an existing rule or suggest a more lenient approach will be framed at once as problematic, someone seeking to cool the spiritual atmosphere.
I am reminded of my own days as an elementary school student. The ongoing friction between teachers and pupils in the Jerusalem Bais Yaakov then revolved around cotton stockings patterned with small holes. Nearly all of us—girls from homes of God-fearing kollel families—wore them. At a certain stage, some teachers began to fight the phenomenon. The next stage was a move to knee socks, and after that came tights. Today, tights—I am not objecting to them; I mention them only as an illustrative example of the phenomenon I am describing—have become an absolute Bais Yaakov standard from kindergarten age onward.
The Broken Ratchet
In the literature, this phenomenon is known as the “ratchet effect,” or, as I prefer to call it, the broken zipper mechanism. Imagine a ratchet wheel, a toothed gear constructed so that its teeth allow motion in only one direction. The moment the lever advances a single notch, a spring locks it in place and prevents any backward movement. Such is the condition in which social change becomes irreversible: once a stringency becomes normative, it is difficult, if not impossible, to go back. Whoever attempts to restore the previous state of affairs—to allow what was permissible and accepted a mere decade earlier—will immediately be regarded as one who breaches the fence.
The recent stories surrounding segregated Chassidic music performances illustrate the broken ratchet at work in real time. Activists, producers, and interested parties involved in such productions flee from branding as compromisers or permissive types as from fire; such labels can deliver a reputational and economic death blow to any public-facing marketing figure. The result, yet again, is the same destructive race toward the most stringent possible standard. And in the end, it is the quiet public that pays the price: the vacuum created by extreme ideology pushes parts of the community to seek entertainment in places the Sages would certainly not approve of.
When I approached the librarian and explained my difficulty—my five-year-old son was being made to wait outside in the cold for an extended period—her response was brief and cutting: “Are you Charedi?”
Here is another example. In the neighborhood Torah library where I held a membership, there are separate hours for women and for men. At first, the separation was enforced from age nine and up. But over time, the ratchet wheels began to turn, someone saw fit to raise the fence, and the age of separation was lowered to five. The practical meaning is that mothers who come to exchange books in the afternoon are forced to leave young boys at home alone or standing outside the library door. When I approached the librarian and explained my difficulty—my five-year-old son was being made to wait outside in the cold for an extended period—her response was brief and cutting: “Are you Charedi?” Since then, of course, I have not dared open my mouth again. The new norm became fixed, though I could find no traditional or religious source for it whatsoever. My silence, and the silence of many others like me who encountered that same closed door, is the fuel that continues to drive the purity spiral.
It is important for me to clarify that I am not claiming the Charedi public is becoming more extreme across every measure. Reality is more complicated than that, and it includes many movements of change and openness as well—some blessed, some destructive. My aim is to explain why extreme norms gain such momentum despite the opposition of a silent majority and why, once entrenched, they become almost irreversible, driven by that same purity spiral.
At the same time, one cannot ignore the deeper processes unfolding at the other end of the scale. Very often, the openness penetrating our camp does not arise from an ideal choice made lechatchilah, but as a counter-movement born of necessity, acute need, or at times painful weakness. I often wonder whether it is precisely this pressure toward ever more stringent extremes that produces, as a counterreaction, a movement suffused with anger—one that may in the end lose precious Torah assets in its desire to escape the suffocation.
I am fully aware that the very act of placing this phenomenon on the table may itself be read as a dangerous signal and exact a personal social price from me. Yet I feel bound to raise it for the sake of all those good and God-fearing people who have found themselves wondering of late: Ribbono Shel Olam, what is happening to us? How did we get here? The goal is not to provoke, but to give language to social processes unfolding beneath the surface and shaping all our lives. Understanding these mechanisms is the first step toward restoring balance and sanity—and a drop of awareness has never yet harmed anyone.
Precisely because the basic assumption is that this phenomenon exists in every society, simply pointing it out will not be the solution. Competition exists in every society, but the way it expresses itself changes. The double comparison made in the article—to military units and to progressive culture—illustrates this well. In a military unit, people will compete over better performance, and it is very possible that those who struggle will be embarrassed to speak about it. Of course, excessive extremism can also be harmful, but in general there is no problem here. The competition is directed toward supporting what truly are the foundational values and goals of that society.
By contrast, what happens in Charedi culture and in progressive culture is a symptom of a deeper problem. These are societies whose ideology was shaped through difficult struggle and in the past led to social changes—desirable in their eyes. But today, not only the social structure, but the ideology itself, has lost its way. What was good in those changes has already come into effect, and what has not already been realized is no longer either positive or possible in reality. If in the past stringencies helped preserve the camp and build protective fences, today those who are inside are already inside, and those outside are already outside.
The channeling of social competition into an ever-increasing strictness of norms is an expression of the fact that there are no longer real goals to aspire to. What other path is open to people, and especially to women, through which to excel? The better the answers to that question, the more the problem will solve itself.
Your view—that a temporary ruling to be lenient or to override Torah law was supposed to come through prophecy, except that we no longer have anyone who knows with certainty, and therefore it comes through sin and error—has a fundamental problem.
Anyone who recognizes that what was not corrected is now being corrected through sin done unintentionally (and a serious source is needed for your claim) is, from that point onward, acting intentionally. And since he is not a prophet, but is merely speculating in his own mind, there is no place for such reasoning within him in matters of halachah. He is obligated to distance himself and separate from it just as with the other laws of the Torah, and certainly not to encourage it.
Thank you for giving clear words to a complex phenomenon
that each of us encounters in our extended family and in our community.
Perhaps, as a beginning, one can suggest paying attention—first of all to ourselves, and if possible also aloud: here, at this moment, there is a step that for me is too extreme. Is there anyone else who agrees?
The goal is not to break fences, but simply to notice.
Yasher Koach for the article. It sheds light on an important point about a social vicious cycle that leads to extremism—to decrees that the public cannot, or should not, be expected to bear.
From a halachic perspective, there is significance to the fact that in public matters it is more appropriate to be stringent. For example, when building a mikveh, all opinions are taken into account stringently, even minority opinions, because in a public matter the standard is supposed to be higher.
The problem is that one must distinguish between halachic enhancement and madness. That is the point of the problem. Because many people are ignoramuses, they mix up halachic stringency with invention.
Not at all. The mikveh example is excellent.
In our town, many years ago, a new mikveh was built. There was a demand from Chabadniks to adopt their preferred enhancement of bor al gabbei bor. They tried to gather support on the basis of the argument that one should go with the highest standard, but they were firmly rejected by the local rabbi, who held that it was inappropriate דווקא to adopt a stricter method, and thereby cast aspersions on other mikvaot, such as those in which our mothers—no less righteous—immersed. The matter even reached a petition by the Chabadniks to the High Court, and Justice Elyakim Rubinstein notably upheld the view of the local rabbi.
The claim that halachah follows the stricter view was not accepted even in matters of ritual purity.
You wonder, and I am certain that these stringencies are exactly what bring about the eruption of leniencies on the other side. Since balance is needed, when people become too stringent in one area, it bursts out elsewhere. Those who are supposed to stop the phenomenon are the rabbis, who have the power to stand up and say: until here. Let this stringency be only for those who want it, but not binding on the entire community. Once the stringencies are brought into balance, there will be no need to break fences elsewhere.
The rabbis say something much simpler: the stringency is for whoever wants it, and whoever cannot handle it can leave the community. Stringencies are not what cause the eruption, but rather suppressed desires. If one can understand where the excessive stringency lies in demanding that a course include only Charedi lecturers, then if that demand is accepted, will it really cause fence-breaking? What may happen is that people will go study in a non-Charedi setting, and the stringent ones will say that instead of those people leaving, they are turning the Charedi framework itself into one that is no longer truly such.
In many cases, the stringencies of part of the public do not really interfere with those who do not observe them. Is it really so difficult for someone who does not eat only under the kashrut of the Eda HaCharedit to eat food that does bear that certification? Is there really a problem with sitting separately, even for someone who does not see that as a halachic obligation? If the event in question had not been professional, would it not have been possible to find Charedi lecturers on topics that would also interest those who initially wanted subjects for which only non-Charedi lecturers were found? The important thing is mutual respect. It is right to appreciate, and sometimes even admire, the fear of Heaven of those who are stringent, but one must also stand up for the rights of those who are not stringent not to have their way of life disrupted. In many cases this can be achieved through respectful dialogue.
I find it hard to believe that they really do not allow a five-year-old child into the library on a cold day. If so, that is an exceptional story. Even at sales events where there is official separation, it is not enforced even on adults. The separation arrangements in public transportation, which disturbed many people, failed completely.
In conclusion, I believe that many fine people in the Charedi public are ready to contain the different nuances in halachic observance, some of which also differ between communities (Lithuanians as opposed to Chassidim, and so on), מתוך an understanding that each river follows its own course. In cases of tension, what matters is to speak with one another and not withdraw in a sense of injury.
An interesting article, well done.
Unfortunately, I think there is no remedy. For years now, Charedi life has no longer really been connected to עבודת השם; it has become something social, like any other group in the world. Someone who does something because he is afraid of what people in the neighborhood will think of him, instead of thinking about what Hashem wants from him, is in serious trouble. A whole generation has grown up with these distorted values, and it will be difficult, if not impossible, to fix.
We must completely separate politics and Torah. There is no other choice.
The phenomenon described above is indeed described correctly, but its causes are not only those mentioned above. They also stem from an essential religious problem, whose content is the question every person is naturally faced with: why are you not more righteous? This is a question to which it is very hard to find an answer, because usually the answer is the evil inclination (or, under another name, physical needs, emotional needs, and so on). Without it, we would all be completely righteous. But people assume that if the reason is the evil inclination, then the situation ought to be changed. The correction will come when people understand that sometimes one must make peace with the evil inclination—not in straightforward mitzvot and prohibitions, where there is no room for maneuver, but when speaking about stringencies, one must absolutely take into account that there is “us,” meaning the evil inclination, standing מול Torah and mitzvot. Yes, there is no choice: one must accept that we stand outside the full will of Hashem. Without denying our obligation to Torah and mitzvot, that understanding will cause people to realize that there is no great wisdom in becoming more stringent, because it is not “me against the evil inclination,” but “me and the evil inclination” against Torah and mitzvot—at least until we move from being beinonim to being tzaddikim.
Thank you for this article!